A more egregious example of failure to report financial matters accurately was the Commonwealth Government's view that the Goods and Services Tax, enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament in 1999, was not a Commonwealth tax. The Prime Minister, John Howard, and his treasurer and finance minister each claimed that the $40 billion or so collected through the GST was a state (and territory) tax. This view was informed by politics. It enabled the Commonwealth to report lower taxation collections and lower spending for the period of the Howard government from 2000-01 when the GST was first collected. Happily, this position was not supported by any state or territory auditor-general, 2 or the Commonwealth Statistician 3 or the Australian Tax
Office. 4 The Commonwealth auditor-general also found that the GST was a 1 Former NSW Auditor General (1992 -1999 Governments manipulate financial statements from time to time, but even unadulterated financial statements are poor tools for effective accountability. They merely show that monies received can be accounted for in the prescribed fashion and, at the agency level, they tell us little more. When government hospitals, for example, publish their audited financial reports, we might be satisfied that public monies have been accounted for in the way required of profit businesses but we have no notion about the effectiveness, efficiency or economy of these entities.
Unfortunately, while financial reports by private-sector bodies contain much of the information required by investors, creditors and employees, they are of little use in the public sector. Seeing whether a publicly listed company is profitable and has sufficient funds to meet emerging liabilities would satisfy most users of financial reports. But almost by definition, the concept of profitability is irrelevant for most central government bodies. Public schools, public hospitals, police services, the defence force, National Parks and other government agencies do not operate in a market where goods and services are exchanged for fees or charges sufficient to meet costs.
In most government agencies, financial resources are merely the means by which these bodies strive to achieve their goals. To meet the accountability gap between financial reporting and goal reporting, the Australian governments introduced the concept of performance audits in 1979.
6 This was followed in 1983 by the decision of the Commonwealth Government to introduce program management in accord with the election promises of the Australian Labor Party.
7
One of the main difficulties with performance auditing, shown for example in its past practice in the NSW government, was the identification of the goals of government programs. Because auditors seek to use external, rather than their own, standards to guide the auditing process, it is important that governments ascribe to their programs their articulated and measurable goals. Where these goals exist, performance auditing can assess whether government programs are efficient in the broadest meaning of that term. But the large number of government programs -and the much smaller number of performance audits undertaken in any Australian jurisdiction -means that performance auditing cannot be used as an annual, comprehensive accountability tool. The lack of comprehensiveness of performance audits suggests that the use of performance indicators for every government program might offer a better accountability tool. These indicators were introduced in the Commonwealth government concomitantly with the introduction of program management. We now see performance indicators in the annual reports of most government agencies and they are also used in documentation to support budgetary allocations.
Another example of their use is found in the New South Wales strategic plan. Unfortunately, we are also seeing an abuse of performance indicators. The most recent published example of such abuse can be seen in the report by the Victorian Audit Office in April 2009, 'Access to Public Hospitals: Measuring Performance'. In this report, the Office noted that a public hospital manipulated the time spent by some patients in the emergency department before they were admitted to the hospital. We also see some agencies choosing not to adopt performance indicators and the choice of poor or inadequate performance indicators by governments. For example, the 2007-08 annual report of the New South Wales Fire Brigades offers no data on the time taken by fire brigade units to arrive at fire sites. The Commissioner of the New South Wales Corrective Services does not disclose in his comments on 'Key performance indicators' in the 2007-08 annual report the recidivism record for his agency.
Because performance indicators have assumed such a central role in the accountability process, and because they are open to manipulation in the same way as financial reports, there is merit in extending government audits to allow an annual audit of the relevance and accuracy of key performance indicators for each government reporting agency. A recent reading of all legislation for Australia's nine auditors-general shows that this mandate presently only exists in Western Australia. Its extension throughout the other eight jurisdictions would add to the health of the Australian democracy.
